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Introduction
As the European Union is preparing to launch the
discussions that will eventually lead to the admission of
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia
and Cyprus, a question that is increasingly being asked by
the prospective members is what should they hope to
obtain from those discussions or accession negotiations.
They have already been told that the negotiations will
determine their terms of accession and will ascertain their
ability to assume the obligations of membership or ‘acquis
communautaire’. In fact what they like to know is whether
they could receive any exceptions or special treatment that
will ease the pain of adjustment to life inside the EU.
They want to know whether and how they can obtain
derogations from the acquis. Yet, ‘derogation’ is a dirty
word in the European Union. No one admits it exists, nor
that it is possible to obtain any during the accession
negotiations. This short paper attempts to separate myth
from reality and highlight what may be realistically pursued
in the negotiations.
As a general rule, it is correct to say that prospective
members of the Union are expected to apply the full acquis
communautaire without any exception. But there are
exceptions to all rules and this rule is no exception in this
respect.
No country has ever been able to apply all the rules on
the date of entry into the Union. Some exceptions must
necessarily be granted because public administration and
private companies need time to adjust to the conditions of
membership. On the other hand, exceptions may also be
needed to avoid too sudden and too large shifts of resources
from one sector of the economy to another. Yet, some
other exceptions are introduced because the Union itself
needs to adjust to the strains of expanded membership. So
it is not absolutely true that derogations are requested only
by the prospective members.
These exceptions are often asserted to be only
temporary or transitional. The ‘official’ view is that if a
country will never be able to comply with the acquis, then
it should consider whether it really fits into the EU. This
view is again generally correct (although permanent
derogations are not unknown) and in this context it should
be noted that the term ‘accession negotiations’ is a
misnomer. It is more appropriately to call them ‘entry
examination’ because this term describes more accurately
what actually happens during accession negotiations. The
actual negotiating part is rather small, while the largest
part is devoted to checking whether a prospective member
fulfils the conditions of membership.
Even the negotiation of temporary exceptions is not as
simple as it may appear at first glance. There is no fixed
length of time, which means that the length of a transitional
arrangement has to be agreed by both sides. Therefore,
requests for such transitional exceptions have to be justified
in a manner that is understood and acceptable to the EU.
The rest of this short paper explains why negotiations
are necessary, reviews the various types of derogations
and provide examples from past accession negotiations to
indicate what appears to be a feasible request for derogation
and how past applicant countries presented and justified
their requests.
Why are negotiations necessary?
If prospective members are supposed to comply fully with
the  acquis communautaire why is there any need to
negotiate at all? There are three general answers to this
question; a political, a legal and an economic.
First, the members of the EU are sovereign states.
They are not simply individuals joining a club. In effect
they are conceding part of their sovereignty and, in the
process, they have an impact on the character or shape of
the EU. It is natural that they would want something in
return. This ‘compensation’ is agreed during the accession
negotiations.
Second, the existing acquis does not make reference to
the rights of future members. The Treaty, for example,
does not specify how many votes they may have in the
Council. Again this is a matter of agreement between the
existing and prospective members. Legally, all Community
acts that make references to member states also have to be
revised to include the names of the new members.
Consequently, accession negotiations are in essence inter-
governmental conferences and the acts of accession modify
slightly a very large part of the acquis.
Third, prospective members can also be ‘desirable’
members. Existing members may be more than willing to
accommodate them by changing the rules appropriately so
as to make their entry into the Union more attractive. The
expansion of the Union is in itself a political act that shifts
outwards its frontiers.
The Treaty hardly lays down any rules on the process
and objectives of the accession negotiations. It only
provides in article O that the ‘conditions of admission and
the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is
founded which such admission entails shall be the subject
of an agreement between the Member States and the
applicant state’. This short reference implies that
adjustments are in principle possible, although one of the
objectives of the Union, as specified in article B, is ‘to
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maintain in full the ‘acquis communautaire’ ’.
Therefore, the purpose of the accession negotiations is
to define the terms of admission and the necessary
adjustment to the Treaties (new members enter
simultaneously into the Union, the three Communities and
all the other treaties and agreements among the member
states and between member states and third countries,
unless it is agreed otherwise).
In practice the terms of admission define:
• the new member’s participation in the institutions of
the Union
• any exceptions from the acquis that may be granted to
it
• the nature and length of the transitional period(s)
• the contribution to the budget and receipts from
particular EC programmes
• any adjustment of common policies to accommodate
the new member
• any special programmes to ease the adjustment of the
new member.
Why are transitional arrangements necessary?
The main reason why transitional arrangements are defined
is to enable the economy and public administration of the
prospective member to adjust to the conditions of
membership. Not only does the economy have to cope
with increased competitive pressure and comply with new
rules, the administration itself needs some time to introduce
those new rules into the domestic legislation and start
implementing them.
Some EU rules can be adopted before the actual date
of membership (e.g. prohibition of cartels, tariff
classification, technical standards), while others, especially
those concerning implementation of Community
programmes, have to await entry into the EU (e.g. the price
intervention mechanisms of the common agricultural
policy, regional support programmes).
The implementation of the acquis may require the
establishment of national or local agencies and/or
enforcement procedures. The setting up of the appropriate
administrative machinery may also require considerable
amount of time.
Transitional arrangements are absolutely necessary in
the case of the financial contributions and receipts of a new
member. The contributions can be calculated and effected
almost from the moment of entry. By contrast, new
members experience a delay in drawing funds from the
budget of the EU because the amount they are able to
receive depends on the extent to which they are integrated
in the various Community programmes. More importantly,
the overall share of a member in the structural funds is a
matter of political agreement rather than of automatic and
objective application of rules.
Agriculture is a case in point. Member states’ receipts
from the funds of the common agricultural policy are
determined on the basis of the previous year’s output.
These statistics do not exist for new members, because the
previous year’s output was not generated within the CAP
framework. Of course, it is possible to calculate notional
output figures for different products, but those are
themselves subject to negotiation. The same happens, for
example, in the case of structural policy programmes. The
initial imbalance between receipts and payments is
redressed by a mechanism of temporary and declining
credits for new members.
Finally, the gradual introduction of new members into
Community programmes or the gradual application of EU
rules may be requested by the EU itself in order to adjust
to expanded membership. For example, in the past existing
EU farmers and steel workers requested gradual application
of the principle of free trade so that they could be temporarily
protected from the products of new members. The same
happened in the case of Luxembourg, which maintained a
ten-year restriction on inward movement of Portuguese
workers. Indeed all countries that entered the EU after its
founding date had to face temporary restrictions on the
movement of workers. The movement of workers is likely
to be an issue of particular concern to EU in the forthcoming
enlargement because of the current very high unemploy-
ment level in the Union.
What should be sought in the accession negotiations?
It would be wrong for a prospective member to focus its
demands or requests only on derogations during the
accession negotiations. Derogations are sought whenever
a country expects to have difficulty (political, social or
economic) in complying with the acquis. But such
difficulties can be overcome by other means.
Instead of asking for an exception from the rules
because compliance is costly or otherwise difficult
(negative attitude), a prospective member could ask for
assistance to be able to comply (positive attitude). Such
assistance may take the form of a special Community
programme supporting adaptation (e.g. de-commissioning
polluting factories), introduction of new practices (e.g.
training) or improving existing capital and infrastructure
(e.g. investment). For example, special assistance schemes
were established for Portugal and for the adaptation of
Spanish steel industry.
Note, however, that resources in the EU, as anywhere
else, are limited. Not all demands for assistance can be met
and prioritisation of needs is necessary. Moreover, the
entry of an applicant country into the EU requires approval
by all existing member states. An applicant may have
difficulty gaining that approval if it is perceived to be a
competitor for the EU’s limited funds.
A different way of avoiding difficult adjustments
without asking for derogations is to persuade the EU to
change itself. Instead of adaptation of the candidate, there
is adaptation of the acquis (which is supposed to be
immutable). This happened with respect to environmental,
health and safety standards in the accession negotiations
of Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden. In that case, the
Union committed itself to review its standards with a view
to raise them to the level of the candidate countries.
Another example is that of Norway which had a
particular problem with opening up its oil fields to
companies from other member states. Instead of insisting
on an outright derogation (even though that was its initial
demand) in the end it settled for a protocol (no. 4 in the act
of accession) in which both the EU and Norway
acknowledged that all member states had the right to
define exclusive rights with respect to petroleum
exploration and exploitation. This was an interpretation of10
the acquis that applied to all rather than only to Norway.
The Union may also accept to expand the acquis to
apply to cases and/or issues not covered by prevailing
rules. This happened again in the case of the negotiations
with the four countries mentioned above, when the Union
added an ‘objective 6’ to its structural policy targets so as
to accommodate the polar regions of Finland and Sweden
with their peculiar regional characteristics which did not
fit into the criteria used in the EU structural policies until
then. Note, however, that objective 6, together with all the
other objectives, will be re-evaluated in 1999 at the expiry
of the current regulation on the structural funds.
Types of derogations
As mentioned earlier, most derogations granted by the EU
are temporary. This does not mean that a prospective
member has no negotiating room for manoeuvre.
Temporary derogations are not pre-determined. Their
time length varies. Greece had an overall five-year
transitional period (for certain products the period stretched
to seven years). Spain and Portugal had a seven-year
transitional period (although for certain sensitive issues
the period was ten years). The most recent members have
had transitional periods varying from one year to nine
years, with an average period of about three years. So there
is much negotiating to be done on the precise time length
of temporary derogations.
Prospective members may strengthen their negotiating
position by making references to the transitional periods
allowed in various EC directives and regulations for
existing members. For example, basic telecommunications
services are supposed to be liberalised as of 1 January
1998. Yet, some member states have been granted an
exception until 2000. The EU will not have enlarged by the
year 2000, but prospective members may be able to invoke
the same reasons justifying gradual adjustment as those
used by existing member states. An even more apt example
is a 1994 directive on waste packaging (requiring recovery
and recycling of waste package). The directive has
transitional periods extending up to ten years because of
the substantial cost of adjusting manufacturing and
marketing processes to recover and recycle waste. It
would indeed be paradoxical if some existing members
have up to 2006 to implement the directive but new
members have to demonstrate compliance as of the date of
their entry into the EU.
Temporary derogations may be granted for a fixed and
short period of time but there is no formula for what is
fixed and/or short. Their length varies according to the
estimated difficulty and extent of adjustment. The fixing
of transitional periods is not as simple as it may appear at
first glance. Some derogations may be prolonged, if deemed
necessary. In this context, the important question is who
deems it necessary. The experience of Austria illustrates
this point well.
During its accession negotiations, Austria requested
restrictions on the transit of heavy vehicles through its
alpine region for environmental reasons. The agreement
that was reached in the end allows for extension of the
present transitional regime if independent studies can
show that there is excessive damage on the environment.
Note that those independent studies will play a decisive
role because the discretion of both Austria and the
Commission on this matter is effectively reduced. Resorting
to this kind of impartial arbitration may be indispensable
in resolving differences of opinion.
Judging from past enlargements, derogations may be
defined in terms of products (e.g. peaches), sectors (e.g.
banking), standards (e.g. environmental measures), factors
of production (e.g. workers), tax measures (e.g. VAT rates
or exempt activities), regions (e.g. certain islands), area of
operations (e.g. amount of re-insurance that can be carried
out in the domestic market by foreign companies), business
practices (e.g. establishment of companies), or private
practices (e.g. purchase of land or currency transfers).
This list is non-exhaustive and many more examples may
be garnered from past accession treaties.
Derogations may be extremely specific and refer to the
particular provision of a certain legal act. On the other
hand, they need not be specific at all. They may also be
general and they may not even take the typical form of an
exception. Instead of requesting an outright exception, a
prospective member may ask instead the EU to recognise
its special needs. This was achieved by Ireland, Greece,
Portugal and Spain which had in their treaties of accession
protocols acknowledging their efforts towards economic
development.
All those protocols begin by noting that economic
development and the improvement of living standards and
working conditions are fundamental EU objectives. Then
they pledge adequate use of Community resources for that
purpose and appropriate application of the provisions of
the Treaty. Subsequent derogations, especially with respect
to article 92 on state aid, have been extended with reference
to those protocols.
When a prospective member anticipates difficulties in
complying with the acquis in a particular area, it may seek
safeguards instead of derogations. Such safeguards allow
for exemptions from the rules only if the need arises, so it
is not imperative to define specific derogations during the
negotiations. General safeguards, especially in manu-
facturing sectors, were agreed in all previous enlargements.
Finally, note that for disagreements on legal issues that
are of minor importance, it may be more useful not to
allow them to block progress on other more important
issues. Yet, instead of simply making concessions, it may
also be possible for the two sides to ‘agree to disagree’.
That is, some disputes are on purpose left unresolved until
a later stage when the Court, for example, could provide its
own impartial interpretation should the need arise. For
example, the sixth VAT directive is subject to continuous
legal interpretation and there is a growing jurisprudence
on its various technical annexes. Austria had a different
view than the EU as to how that directive could be applied
to the letting of apartments. In the end, the two sides chose
a phrase that was general enough that both their views
could be accommodated.
How can requests for derogations be justified?
Derogations are not granted lightly. There must be an
evident need. Such a need is more easily understood if it
can be quantified, or otherwise, if it can be shown that vital
national interests, traditions or important social policies
are significantly affected by adoption of the acquis.11
Requests for derogations from fundamental
Community principles are unlikely to be treated
sympathetically (e.g. the four freedoms of the internal
market). Deviations from such fundamental principles
change the character of the Union and a candidate country
that wants to change the character of the Union will
inevitably be asked to reconsider its application. Even on
these issues, however, one cannot be absolute. If, for
example, the EU insists on transitional arrangements for
the movement of workers or the trade of agricultural
products, it will be virtually impossible for it to refuse to
grant compensatory derogations to prospective members.
Prospective members would hardly have any problem
arguing their case if the derogations they requested were
of minor importance to the EU but of major social
significance to them. For example, Sweden had little
difficulty obtaining a derogation on the marketing of moist
snuff tobacco which is illegal in all other EU countries yet
it is somehow inconceivable to Swede users that they
would have to live without it. Situations like that, however,
are rare. Prospective members have to be prepared to
argue, to argue convincingly and to argue for feasible
derogations.
Given that there is hardly any chance that any of the
current prospective members will obtain any permanent
exception, they should focus on temporary derogations.
Temporary derogations need to be just that – temporary (it
does not mean, however, that renewal or extension is
inconceivable). Hence, the probability of securing a
derogation is higher if the country that requests it, can also
demonstrate how it will eventually be able to comply with
the  acquis. The greater the possibility for eventual
compliance, the lower the reluctance of the EU.
The most forceful argument that prospective members
have at their disposal is the existence of exceptions for
existing members provided in the Treaty and in secondary
legislation. In the Treaty (articles 36, 55, 56) some
restrictions on the freedom to trade, move and establish
may be allowed for specific reasons such as the protection
of national security or public morality. But the permitted
restrictions are very few, very narrowly defined and have
to be applied in a non-discriminatory manner which must
be proportional to the intended effect. Other exceptions
may be possible under article 90(2) for services of general
economic interest and under article 92 on state aid.
Secondary legislation contains many more exceptions
and, therefore, prospective members need to know well
that legislation and the jurisprudence of the Court so that
they can back up their arguments with reasoning that is
compatible with the EU’s own practice. For example, the
second banking directive allows under certain conditions
the imposition of restrictions for the maintenance of the
liquidity of the banking system. The directives on the
liberalisation of air transport and maritime transport,
respectively, allow for the maintenance of special measures
for the encouragement of transport services with remote or
island regions.
Indeed, the practice in past accession negotiations
should also be considered carefully by prospective
members. It will be more difficult for the EU to refuse to
grant exceptions similar to those granted in the past or to
extend similar treatment.
Every country, however, is unique and past or current
EU practice may not provide any useful precedents. In this
case, the prospective member has to rely on more general
arguments. Insisting that adjustment is costly is certainly
not enough. By definition, adjustment is always costly.
The prospective member will have to explain how adoption
of the acquis will somehow cause it permanent and
irreparable damage or reduce its welfare (e.g. reduction of
economic activity, reduction of national standards, etc). In
addition, that country needs to demonstrate that the cost is
substantial, that there are no other means of avoiding that
cost without a derogation, that the derogation is not
contrary to the general principles of the EU (e.g. raise
levels of prosperity, reduce regional disparities, etc) and
that the requested derogation does not have an appreciable
effect on intra-EU trade and competition. Quantified
evidence can only help in making such arguments
convincing. The steps in preparing a persuasive and credible
negotiating argument are identified in greater detail in the
table at the end of the paper.
Finally, note that the drafting of credible arguments
very much depends on prioritisation of the prospective
member’s needs and clear ranking of its capabilities.
Effective internal preparation is of the utmost importance
for the successful conclusion of the negotiations. Moreover,
a prospective member should not ignore the hard bargaining
that will inevitably have to take place internally, among
the various ministries and between the government and the
various economic and social groups. Here the experience
of past applicants is also instructive. They put a lot of effort
in public information campaigns to persuade the sceptics
about the benefits from membership of the European
Union.
How hard can the prospective members bargain?
There are many factors that determine the bargaining
power of a prospective member. But irrespective of size,
level of economic development and political importance,
any country applying for membership of the EU starts
from a position of weakness for at least three reasons.
First, it is the applicant that seeks entry into the Union, not
the other way around. Second, the applicant has to negotiate
on a very large and very complex body of law which may
not be well known to it. Third, it is confronted with 16
views and faces across the negotiating table (15 member
states plus the Commission which does not formally
negotiate but has an important role in making technical
proposals for adoption or amendment by the member
states).
Even though a prospective member talks with the
Presidency that represents the member states, it still has to
take very seriously into account that the common positions
presented by the Presidency are the result of negotiations
within the EU itself. Its structure and complex decision-
making procedures make the EU a very tough negotiator
because it is very difficult for outsiders to understand and
identify its weak points.
At the forthcoming accession negotiations, applicant
countries may have an even more difficult task because the
EU has formulated the so-called Accession Partnerships
which establish a procedure for compliance with the
acquis. The applicants are, therefore, expected to be able12
to adopt the acquis at least in the internal market area
before they enter the Union. The onus will indeed be on the
applicants for the additional reason that the provisions of
the Europe Agreements will have to be implemented
irrespective of the progress of the accession negotiations.
Moreover, the fact that at least initially the EU will be
conducting six negotiations in parallel will probably make
it even less willing to make any concessions to anyone
applicant because the others will naturally demand similar
treatment. This may mean, of course, that what one gets,
all will get. Also, it will not be surprising to see a kind of
competition emerging among the applicants, creating
pressure on them to compromise so as not to be left behind
in case the others manage to reach agreement quickly on
particular issues and move on to new ones.
There is another reason why a prospective member’s
bargaining power may be affected by developments which
are only indirectly related to its own accession negotiations.
That reason is that the EU itself needs to adjust to receive
new members. The EU has embarked on an internal
process of policy reform in the areas of agriculture and
regional/structural development. The outcome of this
process, which has a lot to do with how the EU supports
farmers and poorer regions, will to a considerable extent
determine the attitude of existing members towards
enlargement. As mentioned earlier, a prospective member
should not been seen as a significant competitor for EU
funds. If the internal EU debate turns out to be too
acrimonious and if the end result is too divisive, prospective
members may have to re-think their requests for EU
assistance.
In light of the above, it is perhaps not premature to
conclude that the prospective members would be more
effective in the negotiations by concentrating their efforts
in mastering the acquis and using the precedents from the
EU’s own practice in order to support their requests for
derogations or special treatment.
Finally, note that even when everything else fails, it
does not mean that the prospective member will have to
accept ‘defeat’. Even a very short derogation may be
sufficient because the position of the applicant will change
from prospective to actual member. Once inside the Union,
that country will have more room to negotiate simply
because it will have multiple channels through which to
influence decision-making in the Commission and the
Council. A case in point is the derogations granted to
Sweden and Finland for retaining restrictions on alcohol
and tobacco allowances for travellers. The derogations
were for a fixed period of just two years, yet in December
1996 those two countries arguing from the inside managed
to extend them for another five years!
Conclusions
The EU is a tough negotiator. Prospective members need
to master their portfolios and devote sufficient resources
to that purpose.
Derogations should be sought sparingly. They should
be well motivated and well defined, with the appropriate
time length in each case. References to the EU’s own
practice is indispensable.
Prospective members should remember that it is
membership they seek. Whatever their needs and
circumstances might be, they should demonstrate how the
derogations they request are compatible in some broad
sense with the objectives of the European Union.
RÉSUMÉ
De l’efficacité des négociations d’adhésion à l’Union
européenne: Attentes réalistes, objectifs réalisables,
arguments crédibles
L’Union européenne est sur le point d’ouvrir des
négociations d’adhésion avec le plus grand nombre de
nouveaux membres jamais réunis jusqu’ici. Ces futurs
membres sont censés adopter tous les actes et politiques
communautaires connus sous le nom d’acquis
communautaire. Cependant, aucun pays n’a jamais été
capable d’appliquer toutes les règles à la date d’adhésion
à l’Union. Il faut nécessairement accorder certaines
exceptions dès lors que l’administration publique et les
sociétés privées ont besoin d’un certain temps pour
satisfaire aux conditions de leur appartenance à l’Union.
Bien entendu, les futurs membres veulent savoir s’ils
peuvent aussi obtenir des dérogations qui leur
permettraient de supporter les inconvénients de
l’ajustement.
La vue “officielle” est que seules des exceptions ou
dérogations temporaires seront autorisées. Si un pays sait
qu’il ne sera jamais à même de satisfaire à l’acquis, alors
il doit se demander s’il a vraiment sa place dans l’UE.
Cette vue est généralement correcte (même si l’usage de
dérogations permanentes n’est pas inconnu en la matière)
et, dans ce contexte, il y a lieu de souligner que le terme
“négociations d’adhésion” prête à confusion. Il serait
plus opportun de parler d’ “examen d’entrée”, puisque ce
terme décrit plus précisément ce qui se passe réellement
au cours des négociations d’adhésion. La partie
négociation proprement dite est plutôt restreinte, la plus
grande part étant consacrée à voir si un membre potentiel
remplit les conditions d’adhésion.
Ce bref article tente de séparer le mythe de la réalité
et met en exergue les objectifs que l’on peut
raisonnablement poursuivre au cours des négociations. Il
explique pourquoi les négociations sont nécessaires; il
passe en revue les différents types de dérogations qui
peuvent être accordées; et donne des exemples de
négociations d’adhésion tirés du passé pour montrer
quelles sont apparemment les requêtes réalistes en matière
de dérogation et comment les pays candidats de l’époque
ont présenté et justifié leurs demandes.
La conclusion de cet article est que l’UE sera un
négociateur coriace. Les futurs membres devront maîtriser
leurs portefeuilles et consacrer suffisamment de ressources
à cette tâche. Ils doivent faire preuve de modération dans
leurs demandes de dérogations. Celles-ci doivent être
dûment motivées et bien définies, et assorties d’une période
de transition appropriée dans chaque cas. Les références
à la pratique propre à l’UE seront indispensables. Enfin,
les futurs membres ne doivent pas oublier qu’ils cherchent
à adhérer à l’Union. Quels que soient leurs besoins et
circonstances, ils doivent montrer que les dérogations
qu’ils souhaitent obtenir sont compatibles au sens large
avec les objectifs de l’Union européenne. q13
Twenty-eight Questions to Ask in Preparing a Persuasive Negotiating Position
Understand the acquis:
1. What are the relevant Treaty provisions?
2. What is the relevant secondary legislation?
3. Are there any relevant Court rulings?
Understand your own situation:
1. Why does compliance with the acquis cause problems?
2. What is the nature and magnitude of the problems?
3. Are remedies other than derogations unavailable?
Exceptions/safeguards in treaty or secondary legislation:
1. Are there any?
2. Have they been used or invoked by any existing member? How?
Exceptions/safeguards in past accession negotiations:
1. Did past applicant countries have similar problems?
2. What exceptions did they obtain in their treaties of accession?
3. Can you use similar arguments?
4. Do you have the same negotiating power?
Formulate your own position/request:
1. Do you need a permanent or temporary derogation? Of what time length?
2. Should it be general (recording your needs) or specific (modifying a certain EC act)?
3. Would a safeguard do, instead of derogation?
4. Will compliance with the acquis cause irreparable economic/social damage?
5. Is there no other remedy apart from derogation? Is it proportional to the intended effect?
6. Do your identified needs coincide with the objectives of the EU?
7. Do you suggest mechanisms for eventual compliance with the acquis?
Formulate your back-up position:
1. What is the minimum you can accept?
2. Can you accept a shorter derogation that can be extended after you enter the EU?
3. Can you propose “objective” means of deciding later on whether extension is necessary?
Understand the EU’s position:
1. What is the EU’s offer/target?
2. Are there disagreements among member states?
3. Will the EU itself ask for derogation?
Monitor the other applicant countries:
1. Have they obtained something you have not? Why?
2. Can you request the same?
3. Should you request the same?